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Punitive Damages in Canada: Can the
Coffee Ever Be Too Hot?
BRUCE FELDTHUSEN*
I. INTRODUcTION
This paper is based on the given fact scenario in which the
plaintiff, Mr. Smith, is scalded by coffee purchased at a "drive
through" window operated by the defendant MegaFood. Assume
for the purposes of this analysis that Smith bought the hot coffee
at a Canadian' branch of MegaFood and that the accident oc-
curred in Canada.2 Based on the foregoing, this paper will
explore whether Mr. Smith is entitled to recover punitive damages,
and if so, in what amount.
Punitive damages remain rare in any type of Canadian tort
case. They are almost never awarded in negligence, which is the
basis of Smith's claim. Although no rule prohibits punitive damag-
es in negligence, the authorities are few and cautious. Smith must
establish that MegaFood's conduct toward him was exceptionally
objectionable, outrageous, callous, or reprehensible to recover any
punitive damages at all. "Exceptionally objectionable conduct"
* B.A. (Hons.), Queen's University (Kingston); LL.B., University of Western
Ontario; LL.M. & SJ.D., University of Michigan; Professor of Law, University of Western
Ontario; author of numerous books and articles in the torts and remedies areas, including
several articles about punitive damages. I would like to thank the Law Foundation of
Ontario for its financial assistance that enabled me to engage the research assistance of
Mr. James Fitch.
1. The Province of Quebec has its own civil code quite different from the common
law of punitive damages. The common law of punitive damages is more or less uniform
in the other nine Canadian provinces. This article is restricted to the common law
analysis. For the civil law position, see DANIEL GARDNER, L'EVALUATION Du
PREJUDICE CORPOREL 35-40 (1994).
2. During October through May, coffee served at a Canadian "drive-through" at 180
degrees Fahrenheit would cool considerably by the time it reached the car. Arguably, it
might be difficult to serve hot coffee during a Canadian winter, unless it started out at 180
degrees. On the other hand, relatively few people buy hot coffee during Canada's hot,
muggy summers. Therefore, this paper further assumes that Mr. Smith's accident occurred
in early June or mid-September, perhaps during one of Canada's windows of Southern
California weather.
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encompasses something much worse than basic retailer negligence.
Even proof of MegaFood's knowledge that its coffee would bum
customers may not suffice to meet this standard.
Assuming punitive damages are awarded in a Canadian tort
case, the likelihood of an award of $3.5 million is virtually nonexis-
tent. Civil juries are less common in Canada than in the United
States. Canadian judges are often "principled conservatives,"
careful to respect the legislature's role. Few Canadians would
want to enrich Mr. Smith by $3.5 million, as massive disparity in
wealth remains suspect here. Restraint is part of our national
identity; our citizens do not like notoriety or controversy.
Canadians would rather not make a fuss, and they regard flamboy-
ant jury awards as part of the U.S. legal culture. Such awards, and
the press coverage they generate, strike Canadians as undignified.
At best, we might allow a moderate punitive award against Mega-
Food.
The doctrine on this subject is sparse, but consistent with the
more intuitive approach taken above. Part II of this Article sets
out the basic law of punitive damages in Canada. Part III explores
the difference between punishment and deterrence as a rationale
for punitive damages. Part IV analyzes potential rules for
negligence. Part V discusses the rules governing quantification of
punitive damages. Part VI concludes that a Canadian Court would
balk at such a large punitive damages award.
II. THE BASIC CANADIAN LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
When analyzing Canadian common law, the best place to
begin is with the common law of England. The leading English
authority on punitive damages is Rookes v. Barnard, a 1964
decision of the House of Lords. In Rookes, Lord Devlin drew a
distinction between two related concepts, aggravated damages and
exemplary damages. He also restricted exemplary damage awards,
generally taken as synonymous with punitive damages, to two
categories of cases.4
Lord Devlin defined aggravated damages as a special category
of compensatory damages used to redress special injury to the
plaintiff's dignity or pride.5 Only malevolence or spite or similar
3. [19641 1 All E.R. 367.
4. ht at 407.
5. I
[Vol. 17:793
Punitive Damages in Canada
outrageous conduct by the defendant could trigger aggravated
damages. In other words, aggravated damages were allowed upon
proof of the same type of objectionable conduct used to justify
punitive damages in most other jurisdictions. Lord Devlin did not
clarify why particularly egregious conduct is required to justify ag-
gravated damages. 6 The better explanation is that Lord Devlin
preferred to describe as "aggravated damage cases" the many
punitive damages precedents that lay outside his restrictive catego-
ries.7 At that time, the House of Lords refused to overrule its
decisions8 Lord Devlin then needed some doctrinal device to
distinguish the previous inconsistent authority.
In contrast to the compensatory function of aggravated
damages, Lord Devlin stated that the proper purpose of exemplary
or punitive damages was to punish and deter.' After Rookes,
punitive damages were only available at common law in two
categories of cases: (1) cases involving oppressive, arbitrary, or
unconstitutional action by government servants; and (2) cases in
which the defendant's conduct was calculated to make a profit in
excess of compensatory damages, making it necessary to award
punitive damages to teach that tort does not pay.'0
Many lower Canadian courts rejected the scope of Lord
Devlin's restrictions on punitive damages. It was not until 1989
that the Canadian Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts'
holdings and clarified the law of punitive damages in Canada."
In Vorvis v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia,2 the
Supreme Court explicitly refused to restrict punitive damages
awards to the two categories adopted in Rookes."3 The Court
recognized that, in addition to the two Rookes categories,
"exceptionally objectionable conduct" could also justify punitive
damages in Canada. 4 The court held that punitive damages
could be awarded for conduct deserving of punishment because of
6. See generally id
7. I1.
8. Rookes, [1964] 1 All E.R. at 467.
9. Id at 407.
10. Id at 410.
11. Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 1104-05
(Can.).
12. Id
13. 1d at 1105; see Rookes, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367.
14. Vorvis, [19891 1 S.C.R. at 1107-08.
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its "harsh, vindictive, reprehensible and malicious nature.' 15
Other descriptions of such exceptionally objectionable conduct in
Canadian cases include flagrant, deliberate, outrageous, contemptu-
ous, evil, callous, brutal, malevolent and cruel. 6 As discussed be-
low, this same test for punitive damages applies in a negligence
action.
Oddly, the Vorvis court also endorsed the concept of aggravat-
ed damages found in Rookes."7 It is, of course, unnecessary to
retain a concept of aggravated damages triggered by precisely the
same conduct that justifies punitive damages. Today in Canada,
harsh, vindictive or reprehensible conduct can, and often does,
result in an award of aggravated damages and another award of
punitive damages. In the hypothetical case, Mr. Smith has not
suffered particular damage to his pride or dignity to justify an
award of aggravated damages.
Rookes expressed another important condition for punitive
damages that is a part of Canadian law: the plaintiff must have
been the victim of behavior that is the object of punishment.'
Canadian cases have elaborated on this requirement. The
defendant's exceptional conduct towards the plaintiff cannot be
punished unless that conduct caused the very loss at issue in the
action.19 Some cases reuire the defendant's conduct to specifi-
cally target the plaintiff. If these conditions are satisfied, the
fact that the defendant has also injured other persons is irrelevant
when quantifying punitive damages for the plaintiff The defen-
dant is punished only for conduct directed at the plaintiff
Therefore, Smith could recover punitive damages in Canada
under two different theories. The most common theory is an at-
tempt to classify MegaFood's conduct as exceptionally objection-
able-arbitrary, outrageous, reprehensible, or evil. Alternatively,
15. Id
16. See Couglin v. Kuntz, 17 B.C.L.R.2d 365, affd 42 B.C.L.R. 108 (1990) (B.C.C.A.);
Di Domenicantonio v. Canadian Nat'l Ry., No. 246/86/CA, 1988 N.B.J. No. 133 WL, Quick
Law, at *1 (Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1988); Vlchek v. Koshel, 52 D.L.R. 371, 372 (1988)
(B.C.S.C.); Kaytor v. Lions Driving Range, 35 D.L.R.2d 426, 429-30 (1962) (B.C.S.C.);
Claiborne Indus. v. Nat'l Bank of Can., 59 D.L.R.4th 533, 565 (1989) (Ont. C.A.).
17. Vorvis, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1097-1104; see Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367.
18. Rookes, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367, 411.
19. Guarantee Trust Co. of Can. v. Public Trustee, 20 O.R.2d 247 (1978) (H.C.); See
also Vorvis, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1085.
20. See Kaytor, 35 D.L.R.2d 426; Di Domenicantonio, 1988 N.BJ. No. 133; contra
Vichek, 52 D.L.R.3d 371.
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he might sue under a "tort for profit" theory. Under either
theory, Smith must satisfy the relational requirements: that he was
a victim of the conduct in question, possibly a targeted victim, and
that the conduct in question caused his injury.
III. THE PURPOSE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Lord Devlin asserted in Rookes that the purpose of punitive
damages was to punish and deter.2 ' He may have been unaware
that these are not necessarily compatible goals. Both the awarding
of punitive damages in negligence, and the proper size of such an
award depends on which rationale governs the legal rule. In
Canada, the punitive rationale governs. A $3.5 million award for
the purpose of punishment, however, is improbable.
Punishment is based on retribution, a matter of just desserts.
Based on this view, punishment is a debt to society. One looks
back at the conduct at issue to determine whether punishment is
deserved and, if so, in what measure. The punishment should be
proportionate to the gravity of the act deserving of punishment.
Typically, advertent wrongdoing--conduct the defendant knew or
should have known was wrong-is punished.2
Punishment also has a deterrent effect. Deterrence seeks to
influence the behavior of all potential actors, not just the future
conduct of a particular defendant. Rational actors are assumed to
weigh the anticipated costs of transgressions against the anticipated
prospective benefits. The prospect of punishment may affect
future conduct. This idea is captured when we speak of punishing
someone to teach him, or her, a lesson. Perhaps this is what Lord
Devlin meant when he said the purpose of exemplary damages was
to punish and deter.2 As long as one looks backward, however,
to determine the proper proportionate measure of punishment, the
deterrent effect of retributive punishment is incidental.
The first question to ask is, "How much deterrence do we
want?" Sometimes the legislature answers this question precisely.
One can imagine a jurisdiction that statutorily prohibits marketing
beverages at a temperature higher than 150 degrees. Negligence
law only addresses the deterrence of unreasonable conduct. In
21. Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367.
22. Bruce Feldthusen, Punitive Damages in Contract and Tort, 16 CAN. Bus. LJ. 241,
247 (1990).
23. Rookes, [1964] 1 All E.R. at 407.
1995]
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that regime, an economic analysis helps us to be more precise.
Legal economists propose an efficient, or cost-justified, number of
accidents,24 labelled as a "market for accidents." In this market,
society effectively agrees to a trade-off between accident costs and
prevention costs. Anticipated tort damages impel potential
defendants to account for accidents in defendants' cost structure.
The anticipated tort damages are then built into and reflected in
output and pricing decisions. The higher the anticipated accident
cost, the higher the product's price. At a higher price, fewer
products are sold. The fewer products sold, the fewer the product-
related accidents. If the anticipated accident cost is high enough,
the product will be priced off the market. Otherwise, consumers
get the accident rate they are willing to accept in return for the
benefits of the product.
The theory of the perfect "market for accidents," however, is
not borne out in practice. One reason is that price-setters fre-
quently err on the side of optimism and set anticipated accident
costs lower than the true accident costs. Tort liability only works
to deter inefficient accidents when anticipated damages accurately
reflect the true cost of accidents. This requires full and accurate
compensation of each victim in every case. The rational actor
generates the cost-justified number of accidents when faced with
the prospect of such "perfect" liability.
It is doubtful that compensatory damages are a full and
accurate measure of total social accident costs. Many emotional
or related financial losses to family and employers, for example,
will not be recoverable. It is also unlikely that every potential
defendant expects to be caught and held liable for every accident
they negligently cause. Therefore, to make civil liability an
effective market deterrent for accidents, it is necessary to "gross
up" compensatory damages.' This would correct defendants'
expectations that they might escape from paying the full costs in
every case. The terms "punitive" or "exemplary" damages could
describe such a deterrence "gross up." The proper deterrence
measure could exceed, or be less than, the retributive measure.
24. A working definition of a "cost-justified" accident would be an accident that
rational, risk-neutral, informed consumers would be willing to risk rather than pay to
prevent.
25. Feldthusen, supra note 22, at 250.
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There is no reason to expect that a proper measure of one will be
in any way related to an appropriate measure of the other.
No single Canadian judicial decision has explored the implica-
tions of these inconsistent rationales for punitive damages. No
decision has conclusively accepted one rationale over the other.
While the term exemplary damages suggests deterrence, and the
term punitive damages suggests punishment, many cases, like
Rookes, use the terms interchangeably.26 Parsing phrases from
Vorvis lend mild support for punishment over deterrence.27
Despite the lack of clear evidence, the common law of punitive
damages in Canada, as it has developed to date, is predicated on
punishment, not economic deterrence.
One would search in vain, in judicial opinions or in the
general legal literature and economics journals, for any discussion
of a deterrence "gross up," or the like. Most judges and lawyers
would find the economic deterrence arguments bizarre, if not
incomprehensible. Any references in such literature to deterrence
would be consistent with the incidental deterrent effect of any
punishment.
The basic requirement that the defendant's misconduct be
exceptional is only consistent with the punishment rationale, not
the deterrence rationale. There is no reason to require the
defendant to act outrageously, maliciously, or with reckless and
wanton disregard, if deterrence is the goal. Strictly speaking, there
is no reason to require the defendant to do anything wrong if
deterrence is the goal.2 The defendant is merely a means to an
end. A deterrence "gross up" is appropriate for ordinary negli-
gence because it might encourage potential defendants to act more
carefully.
The concept of corrective justice best explains ordinary tort
doctrines. This concept requires an unmediated response from
wrongdoer to victim. The requirement that the punitive damages
award relate to the particular wrong done to the particular victim
is consistent with notions of corrective justice. That requirement
makes no sense under deterrence rationale, however, where the
26. Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367.
27. See Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085 (Can.).
28. To make this seem less farfetched, consider the case for punitive damages against
an employer whose liability is strict, based on respondeat superior.
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particular parties are used as means to achieve some greater social
goal.
Punitive damages awards in Canada tend to be both unusual
and very small. A 1990 study of reported decisions in Ontario,
Canada's most populous province, revealed that the highest puni-
tive damages award was $50,000.29 The great majority of punitive
damages were for less than $25,000.30 Court files revealed that
the median punitive damages award was approximately twenty
percent of the compensatory damages awarded in the same case.'
These awards were often large enough to comport with the
retributive theory, but seldom large enough to constitute a mean-
ingful general deterrent.
IV. P uNrvE DAMAGES IN NEGLIGENCE
This section addresses the relatively undeveloped law of
punitive damages in negligence. Keeping the punitive rationale in
mind may illuminate some of the issues. The punitive rationale
also plays an important role in the discussion of quantum.
If Smith is going to recover punitive damages from MegaFood,
he must convince the court to award them in a negligence action.
According to the Vorvis Court, punitive damages are not available
for breach of contract unless the conduct complained of constitutes
an independently actionable wrong. 2 In Canada, there is no
common law doctrine of strict product liability or similar tortious
warranty, and nothing in the facts supports an action in intentional
tort.
Canadian law does not bar recovery of punitive damages in
negligence. In fact, the possibility of punitive damages in negli-
gence, however slim, was endorsed judicially eighty years ago in a
passage that continues to be quoted today:
In the cases of personal injuries occasioned by negligence, exempla-
ry, vindictive, retributory, or punitive damages cannot be recovered
29. Neil Vidmar & Bruce Feldthusen, Exemplary Damage Claims in Ontario: An
Empirical Profile, 16 CAN. BuS. U. 262, 264 (1990). A striking exception was the $4.8
million punitive damages award made by the Court of Appeals in Claiborne Indus. v. Nat'l
Bank of Can., 59 D.L.R.4th 533 (1989)(Ont. C.A.). This is less exceptional than it appears
because the rationale was restitutionary in a tort for profit situation. Id. In my opinion,
the Claiborne case was also wrongly decided. See Feldthusen, supra note 22, at 248-51.
30. Vidmar & Feldthusen, supra note 29, at 264.
31. Id. at 265.
32. Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085 (Can.).
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unless there was such entire want of care as to raise a presumption
that the defendant was conscious of the probable consequences of his
carelessness and was indifferent, or worse, to the danger of the
injury to other persons.3
Only two decisions, however, have awarded punitive damages
in negligence,3 4 and no developed body of case law governs the
possible intricacies of punitive damages in negligence. Much of
what follows, therefore, is supposition.
Under the punishment rationale, punitive damages should be
awarded only for advertent negligence, not for spur-of-the-moment
acts of individual carelessness. Relevant Canadian case law is
consistent with this approach, and Smith easily satisfies this
requirement here. Regardless of what MegaFood knew or should
have known when it originally decided to sell coffee at 180
degrees, it was put on notice after being subjected to 750 lawsuits.
Interestingly, in products liability cases of this sort, establish-
ing negligence may be more problematic than establishing
advertence. One argument is that MegaFood is negligent for
simply marketing coffee at 180 degrees, knowing that it could
cause third degree bums. Our legal test asks whether the
defendant was "unreasonable" under the circumstances. The
customary conduct of competitors provides some, but not conclu-
sive, evidence on that question.
The "Hand formula" approach,35 arguably a more articulate
version of the reasonable care standard, asks whether the severity
of the foreseeable bum injuries discounted by their probability
exceeded the aggregate benefits to consumers who prefer piping
hot coffee.36 Possibly they do not, especially in Canada where,
due to the colder climate, the probability of injury is presumably
lower and the need for hot coffee is presumably greater than in
many U.S. states. MegaFood should argue that piping hot coffee
is a distinctive and valued consumer product. An argument of this
sort might convince a judge, and even a jury. Important for
present purposes is that the deliberate decision to expose some
members of the population to a known risk of personal injury is
33. Jackson v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 24 D.L.R. 380, 387 (1915) (Alta. C.A.).
34. Coughlin v. Kuntz, 17 B.C.L.R.2d 365, affd 42 B.C.L.R.2d 108 (1990) (B.C.C.A)
($25,000 for medical negligence); Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club, Ltd., 124 D.L.R.3d
228 (B.C. Ct. App. 1981).
35. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
36. Id.
19951
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not by definition negligence, let alone negligence of the exception-
al sort that would justify punitive damages. If punitive damages
are to be awarded in cases like this, careful instructions to the jury
are necessary.
37
A better argument is that MegaFood was negligent in failing
to warn consumers who prefer hot coffee that they assume the risk
of third degree burns. The pure market for accidents, discussed
above, requires that all parties be fully informed. MegaFood is in
the best position to provide this information about its product.
After many burns occur, one could argue that MegaFood's failure
to warn was advertent and exceptionally objectionable, warranting
punitive damages.
Even better evidence would be to show that MegaFood failed
to provide warnings with the knowledge that such warnings would
cause the demand for 180 degree coffee to drop and make coffee
sales unprofitable.8 Such evidence would serve as an admission
that the market for accidents is not working, and that MegaFood
was exploiting the market's malfunction for profit. This might be
classified as exceptionally objectionable conduct. It might also be
addressed under the tort for profit rationale, discussed below.
Smith may face a further hurdle. Some Canadian cases have
held that to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must have been
a specifically targeted victim of the defendant's advertent negli-
gence.39 In other words, conduct that exposes an undefined
segment of the population to a risk of injury, however egregious,
may not justify an award of punitive damages to those who happen
to be injured. In effect, punitive damages in negligence are limited
to situations that are all but technically governed by intentional
torts.' Provided that the requirement of exceptional conduct is
37. See Robitaille, 124 D.L.R.3d at 250 (citing Michael Carlton Garrett, Allowance of
Punitive Damages in Product Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REV. 613, 626 (1972) ("Therefore,
such extraordinary damages should not be predicated on the mere showing that the
plaintiff was injured due to a defective product which was manufactured or distributed by
the defendant.")).
38. The proper measure of accident avoidance cost is not the private cost to
MegaFood of losing business, but the social cost, the value of 180 degree coffee to the
informed consumers who would still have preferred it.
39. See Kaytor v. Lions Driving Range, 35 D.L.R.2d 426,429-30 (1962) (B.C.S.C.); Di
Domenicantonio v. Canadian Nat'l Ry., No. 246/86/CA, 1988 N.B.J. No. 133 WL, Quick
Law, at *1 (Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1988); contra Vlchek v. Koshel, 52 D.L.R.3d 371 (1988)
(B.C.S.C.).
40. In fact, the only two relatively recent cases to have made a punitive damages
award in negligence are consistent with this requirement, although the courts did not
[Vol. 17:793
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taken seriously, and provided that MegaFood were punished only
for what it did to Smith, I do not see any justification for the
targeting requirement. Nevertheless, this remains unresolved.
Smith might attempt to satisfy the targeting requirement by
claiming that MegaFood is vicariously liable for the acts of the
employee who "targeted" him by serving him the coffee. A vicar-
ious liability claim would change the standard of care analysis.41
The server's conduct, even if negligent, may not meet the excep-
tional conduct threshold. The defendant's wealth, however, is a
relevant consideration in quantifying an award of punitive
damages. Presumably, a judge or jury would consider the wealth
of the server, not the employer, and therefore would be unlikely
to give an award of $3.5 million. The no-fault theory of responde-
at superior provides further complication by holding the employer
strictly liable for punitive damages. Punishment is predicated on
fault. Many Canadian courts have imposed punitive damages
vicariously, but have not addressed theoretical problems with doing
SO.
42
To summarize, Smith may be entitled to an award of punitive
damages if the court rejects the requirement that the defendant
specifically targeted the plaintiff The most promising theory for
recovery is based on the allegedly advertent and exceptionally
objectionable conduct of MegaFood in marketing dangerously hot
coffee without a warning.
V. THE SIzE OF THE AWARD
We turn now to the question of quantum. Based on intuition
alone, the chances of a Canadian judge or jury awarding punitive
damages in the million-dollar range on anything but a theory of
restitution are virtually nonexistent. In the unlikely event that
such an award materialized at trial, it would probably not survive
an appeal.43 In this context, Canada is a more conservative
specify targeting as a requirement. See Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club, Ltd., 124
D.L.R.3d 228 (B.C. Ct. App. 1981); Coughlin v. Kuntz, 17 B.C.L.R.2d 365, aff'd 42
B.C.L.R.2d 108 (1990) (B.C.C.A.).
41. See Di Domenicantonio, 1988 N.BJ. No. 133 (discussing vicarious liability);
Robitaille, 124 D.L.R.3d at 243.
42. Di Domenicantonio, 1988 N.B.J. No. 133; Robitaille, 124 D.L.R.3d at 243.
43. By way of comparison, consider the case for non-pecuniary damages in
catastrophic personal injury cases. The Supreme Court of Canada, quite independent of
any legislative initiative or public pressure, has imposed a cap on non-pecuniary loss of
19951
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country than the United States. Having said that, I will explore
how far Canadian law might be pushed in support of a $3.5 million
award.
A. Deterrence Rationale
Depending on the evidence, $3.5 million might be an appro-
priate deterrence "gross up." An award of this size might be
necessary to make MegaFood account for the true cost of
accidents. Ordinarily, the court or jury will have difficulty
quantifying the award on such a basis. Over-deterrence becomes
a concern, especially in negligence. It is not implausible, however,
that major corporations like MegaFood accumulate information
regarding accident costs. If such information became available to
Smith's lawyer, and in turn to a Canadian court, a $3.5 million
award is plausible. The deterrence rationale, however, is not yet
and is unlikely to become part of general Canadian common law.
For the reasons given below, I doubt that Canadian courts would
want to enrich Smith to that extent.
B. Retributive Rationale
A punitive rationale also fails to justify a $3.5 million award.
Retributive punishment is intended to be proportionate to the
wrong. If "the wrong" includes the total of every wrong done to
every consumer exposed to the risk of burn, plus all wrongs done
to every person who was in fact burned, $3.5 million becomes as
plausible a number as any. In Canadian law, the plaintiff may only
recover punitive damages for the wrongs actually done to him."
Smith could recover an amount thought proportionate to the
conduct that injured him. His award should not reflect the desire
to punish wrongs done to others. The amount of the wrong done
to Smith would thus be considerably less than $3.5 million.
There is a certain doctrinal purity to accounting for only the
wrongdoer and the victim. They are the only parties to the action.
This requirement also addresses punitive damages from the
perspective of both parties. Even if we want to punish MegaFood
to the extent of $3.5 million, on what theory would we want Smith
alone, of all the potential plaintiffs, to recover that amount?
approximately $200,000 (in 1995 U.S. dollars). See Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alta. Ltd.,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 (Can.).
44. See Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 1104-10 (Can.).
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Punitive damages might be seen as an incentive for privatized law
enforcement. This "bounty-hunter" argument would not be well
received in Canada. Even if it were, $3.5 million is an excessive
bounty. There are related problems. Should the bounty go to the
first case to reach a jury? Are we sure another plaintiff will not
get another $3.5 million in another jurisdiction? On the other
hand, requiring case-by-case litigation for the purpose of punishing
a general course of conduct is cumbersome in the extreme.
Perhaps class actions, a vehicle still in its infancy in Canada, would
strike the right compromise.
C. Tort for Profit Rationale
Lord Devlin's tort for profit justification for punitive damages
is also part of Canadian law. It is unclear, however, whether the
purpose of a such an award is to teach: (1) that tort does not pay,
(2) that tort calculated to pay does not pay, or (3) that tort cyni-
cally calculated to pay does not pay. Nor is it clear whether the
concern is with torts that do pay or with torts committed in the
hope they might pay.
In almost any product liability negligence case, the tort might
be classified as tort for profit. Clearly, neither Lord Devlin nor
any Canadian court would allow punitive damages in each such
case. It seems reasonable to have liability for "tort calculated to
pay" in the case of deliberate tort for profit. In the MegaFood
case, if Smith can prove that MegaFood deliberately avoided
warning its consumers in order to profit from their ignorance, and
if, as seems likely, it actually did profit, this would justify an award
of punitive damages. I see no reason to further require cynical
calculation or further exceptional conduct. Nor do I see that
proceeding under this theory advances the plaintiff's case for
punitive damages beyond that of the basic exceptional conduct
rationale. It might, however, affect the appropriate size of the
award.
Under either the deterrence or punitive rationales, quantifying
the award involves much guesswork. Smith's case may be stronger
if he could prove that MegaFood actually profited from its wrong
in the amount of $3.5 million. The judge or jury would then have
confidence that it would be appropriate to punish MegaFood to
that extent. Such an award merely restores the status quo ante
and would not constitute punishment. Nor would it achieve
deterrence unless the probability of perfect sanctions was a
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deterrent, in which case an even larger award might be appropri-
ate.
The general problems with Smith alone recovering the $3.5
million, however, remain. For that reason alone, a Canadian court
would likely balk at such a large award, even if documented on an
unjust enrichment basis.4 I think Smith would be restricted to
the profit MegaFood made at his personal expense. This is what
Lord Devlin had in mind.' Obviously, based on the foregoing,
Smith would do better seeking retributive punishment rather than
recovery of the profit MegaFood made in selling him the coffee.
VI. CONCLUSION
I do not claim the Canadian solution to this problem is
superior to others. By requiring case-by-case punishment, we are
either incurring unnecessary transaction costs or, more likely, we
are allowing a good deal of conduct deserving of punishment to go
unreproached. Much can be said in favor of more extensive
punishment and civil deterrence effected through punitive damages
awards. Indeed, one might make an even stronger case for
punitive damages in Canada than in the United States, because the
Canadian case is likely to be heard by a judge alone.
No one, certainly no unsuspecting person, should be burned
to satisfy a general consumer preference for dangerously hot
coffee. Yet the prospect of paying compensatory damages to 750
other victims did not change MegaFood's practice. This suggests
that some sort of deterrence "gross up" is in order. A $3.5 million
jury award, paid to a single victim, may be an unsophisticated
response. I am uncertain that such a response is better than doing
little or nothing, as might be the case in Canada. Fortunately, in
this case, if MegaFood alters its behavior in the United States, it
will likely do so in Canada as well. This is one benefit of Canada
being a branch plant economy.
The Canadian regime best reflects the theoretical underpin-
ning of tort as understood in our culture. Compensating accident
victims is an accepted part of our tort law. Punishing wanton,
reckless, or outrageous conduct through the civil system is
45. But see Claiborne Indus. v. Nat'l Bank of Can., 59 D.L.R.4th 533 (1989) (Ont.
C.A.). Using the tort for profit rationale, the court, perhaps unwittingly, awarded $4.2
million in punitive damages to plaintiffs who had not been wronged to that extent by the
conduct in issue.
46. See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367, 411.
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accepted in rare cases only, and then only in judicious amounts.
We are not yet ready to delegate to judges, much less to juries, the
task of regulating and punishing industry with million dollar
punitive damages awards, especially in the absence of legislative
direction. Nevertheless, the pull of U.S. culture, legal and
otherwise, is powerful.

